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What words mean and express: semantics and pragmatics of kind terms and verbs  
 
Abstract 
For many years, it has been common-ground in semantics and in philosophy of 
language that semantics is in the business of providing a full explanation about how 
propositional meanings are obtained. This orthodox picture seems to be in trouble these 
days, as an increasing number of authors now hold that semantics does not deal with 
thought-contents. Some of these authors have embraced a “thin meanings” view, 
according to which lexical meanings are too schematic to enter propositional contents. I 
will suggest that it is plausible to adopt thin semantics for a class of words. However, 
I’ll also hold that some classes of words, like kind terms, plausibly have richer lexical 
meanings, and so that an adequate theory of word meaning may have to combine thin 
and rich semantics. 
  
1. Introduction 
For many years, it has been common-ground in semantics and in philosophy of 
language that semantics is in the business of providing a full explanation about how 
truth-conditional meanings are obtained. In this vein, it has been assumed that the goal 
of the discipline is to provide a description of how lexical meanings combine 
compositionally to produce a proposition, i.e., a thought content. Perhaps it has not 
always been put in terms of thoughts, but, as it has also been assumed that propositions 
are the contents of propositional attitudes, semantics has been assumed to be concerned 
with explaining how sentences, or sentences in contexts, express thoughts. This 
orthodox picture seems to be in trouble these days. An increasing number of authors 
now hold that semantics does not deal with thought-contents. In particular, they hold 
that the semantic values corresponding to word-types may have the “wrong format” 
(Recanati, 2004, Carston, 2012, 2013, 2016a) to produce propositional contents. This, in 
most cases, amounts to saying either that there is a proprietary semantic ontology, i.e. 
that there is a distinctive realm of meanings, a realm apart from the realm of contents, or 
that lexical meanings, although drawing from conceptual material, are too schematic to 
enter propositional contents. In this paper I will be concerned with these two positions, 
which I will call “thin semantics”. The differences between these two positions are not 
as important as it might seem: to a large extent, it depends on what we take concepts to 
be. If, for instance, we assume that concepts are the building blocks of thought-contents, 
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then the claim that lexical meanings do not stand for pieces that can form part of 
propositional contents ipso facto entails that lexical meanings are not conceptual1. 
Chomsky’s writings against truth-conditional, denotational, semantics have been clearly 
influential in this general movement away from past orthodoxy (e.g., Chomsky, 2000, 
Yalcin, 2014, Pietroski, 2005, 2017). However, he has not been the sole influence by 
any means. The contextualist movement in pragmatics has had a profound impact as 
well. For instance, Charles Travis’ influential attack on truth-conditional semantics has 
many points in common with Chomsky’s, both in terms of the kind of problematic 
examples he uses and in terms of the general lesson he seems to draw from these 
examples (Travis, 2008). Carston’s (2002) and Recanati’s (2004) style of contextualism, 
on the other hand, has targeted the idea that lexical meanings could be concepts (i.e. the 
mental representations we use in higher level cognition) and that sentences could 
encode truth-evaluable compositions of concepts (i.e., psychologically real thoughts). It 
is also interesting to mention that the distinction between the semantic and the 
conceptual can be found as well both in work dating from the late eighties/early nineties 
(Bierwisch and Schreuder, 1992) as well as in recent work in Cognitive Linguistics 
(Evans, 2009). The idea, in all cases, is that the link between words and concepts is 
mediated by intermediate representations that, in one way or other, constrain what 
concepts a word can express.  
In this paper, I will present a view according to which propositional contents arise from 
combinations of rich, structured, concepts, and more schematic meanings. By focusing 
on kind terms on the one hand and verbs on the other, I will try to show that this general 
view has some plausibility2.  I will try to argue that prototypical nouns such as kind 
terms give access to rich concepts, some kind of structured encyclopedic information, 
                                                          
1 Recanati (2004) distinguishes two versions of the “wrong format” view. According to the first version, 
lexical meanings are too schematic and informationally poor to be part of truth-conditional contents. 
According to the second version, lexical meanings are too rich to be building blocks of propositional 
contents: propositional contents are composed of only part of the information provided by lexical 
meanings. I find more appropriate to reserve the label ‘wrong format’ only for the view which holds that 
lexical meanings are not conceptual. This view has it that, in effect, word-type meanings come in the 
“wrong” representational format. In any case, this terminological point is not important, and I will make 
scarce use of the label “wrong format”.  
2 Cohen (1971) is a clear antecedent of rich lexical semantics: he argues that the meaning of connectives 
in natural language is far richer than their logical counterparts and that occasional meanings of 
connectives result from selection of some features and deletion of others. Wierzbicka (1985), on the other 
hand, can be seen as an antecedent of the view that kind terms have rich meanings (see also, Moerdijk, 
2008), and even as an antecedent of the view that verb meanings have a comparatively thinner semantics 
(Goddard and Wierbicka, 2016). 
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which is relevant to construe propositional, truth-evaluable, contents. In contrast, verbs 
provide just some abstract information that is enriched and specified in context, to a 
large extent depending on the arguments they take. The meanings of both kinds of terms 
can be modulated in context (Recanati, 2010), but whereas modulation of kind term 
meanings typically result in vague and open-ended ad hoc concepts (Allot and Textor, 
2012), modulation of verb meanings look more like specifications or concretizations.   
The structure of the paper is the following. I will begin by presenting reasons that have 
convinced some that semantics requires its own ontology or representational level, and 
how these authors account for some of the facts that semantics was assumed to have to 
explain. In order to keep the discussion focused, I will use some of Robyn Carston’s 
proposals as illustration, given that she is one of the authors who have devoted more 
work to this issue, beginning with her proposals in Carston (2002). While in Carston 
(2016b), she advances a rather different account and even criticizes the “thin meanings” 
approach, her past views are still among the most worked-out proposals in the thin 
meanings camp. After presenting Carston’s past suggestions, I will present some 
particular facts that thin meaning theories have to explain, and argue that thin semantic 
meanings find no role to play in the most sensible explanations compatible with the 
theories. This, I will try to show, should take us towards a different picture, where the 
lexical meanings of at least some lexical pieces are taken to contain rich conceptual 
information. However, not all lexical pieces are likely to be as informationally rich as 
others. Kind or sortal nouns (i.e. nouns which denote kinds, or sortals) are likely to be 
rich, while, e.g., verbs, are probably sketchier, which eventually means that semantic 
theory has to combine thin and rich lexical meanings.   
2. Semantic underdeterminacy 
One powerful source of discomfort with traditional truth-conditional semantics is the 
generalization of the phenomenon known as “semantic underdeterminacy” (Carston, 
2002), which consists in the claim that the semantic information encoded by a sentence 
underdetermines its propositional meaning. Carston and other pragmaticians show that 
even very simple sentences can express different propositions in different contexts after 
their eventual indexical constituents have been fixed. Propositions, on this account, are 
psychologically realistic thoughts, i.e., truth-evaluable compositions of concepts/mental 
representations, but their view generalizes to any other account of propositional 
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contents. In general: sentences fall short of having, or carrying, propositional contents, 
because variations in the context of utterance of a sentence generate variations in its 
truth-evaluations. To this, it has to be added that we are not justified in identifying any 
of these possible propositional contents as the proposition expressed by the sentence. 
That is, all, or at least, many, of the propositions that the sentence can be used to 
express are on equal footing in this respect. 
According to Carston and many others, the reason why sentences do not have 
propositional contents is that some of their constituting parts (words) do not have 
determinate, stable, contents which can form part of propositions. Many examples 
illustrate this: putting it now in terms of denotations, the genitive in ‘John’s car is fast’ 
can stand for the relation property of, as well as the relation being driven by, the 
relation having bet on, etc. In ‘the leaves are green’ (Travis, 1996), it is customarily 
said that ‘green’ can stand for a certain color that the leaves possess or a certain color 
that they display. And as stressed by Chomsky (2000), even proper names lack a fixed 
denotation: ‘London’ can stand for a determinate geographical place, its inhabitants, its 
Council, etc. Lacking a stable denotation is not something that affects some particular 
class of words: it is a rampant phenomenon. So it can be said that, on the face of it, 
word-types do not contribute contents/denotations to sentence meanings. If, instead of 
talking about denotations, we talk about concepts-as-mental particulars, the upshot we 
get is that, apparently, word-types do not contribute concepts to sentence meanings. In 
other words, the standing or lexical meaning of a word cannot be a concept. 
Now, if all this is granted, then it seems that if there is something that can be called 
lexical meaning, it has to contain some distinctive, proprietary, information. This is 
what makes Carston suggest that that the linguistic meaning of sentence constituents 
may rather consist in pointers to conceptual space (Carston, 2002), that the semantic 
information attached to lexical entries is very close to syntactic information (Carston, 
2008), or that the meaning of words may be too schematic to be conceptual (Carston, 
2012)3. Note, however, that Carston has never fully endorsed any of these ideas. 
Rather, she has considered them working hypotheses, along with the hypothesis that 
word-meanings might be too rich in information to enter into propositional compounds 
                                                          
3 The idea that lexical meaning can be pointers to conceptual space is open to different interpretations, 
some of which are compatible with the view I want to defend. I propose to focus instead on Carston’s 
more recent proposals, which make clear that words encode schematic, or underspecific, information. 
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(Carston, 2012)4. The general idea behind her proposal and other proposals by other 
authors is that semantic representations somehow only constrain what range of concepts 
a word can express. Thus, according to Travis, “[w]hat words mean plays a role in 
fixing when they would be true; but not an exhaustive one.” (Travis, 1996: 451). And in 
Bierwisch and Schreuder’s (1992) two-level semantics, the semantics of a word 
provides necessary conditions on its conceptual meaning, which is typically richer than 
its properly semantic meaning. Thorough the paper, I will take it that a thin meanings 
theory holds (a) that lexical meanings constrain the uses of a word, and (b) that they do 
it by encoding certain schematic meaning which applies to all, or at least most, of the 
correct uses of the word (for other proposals along these lines, and from different fields, 
see Ruhl, 1989, Klepousniotou et al., 2008, Frisson, 2009, 2015). 
3.  Regular polysemy 
The main first worry about the accounts which posit properly semantic representations 
(or, in general, which make lexical meanings schematic or “thin”) is that they do not 
have good explanations which make use of the posits of the theory for a lot of 
systematic patterns in linguistic understanding . Let me begin by introducing regular 
polysemy, before discussing how a model of thin semantics can deal with it, and 
comparing it with a “rich semantics” model. 
Apresjan (1974: 16) defined the polysemy of a word a with the senses Ai and Aj as 
regular if there exists at least one word b with the polysemous senses Bi and Bj, being 
semantically distinguished in exactly the same way as Ai and Aj, and irregular if the 
semantic distinction between Ai and Aj is not exhibited by any other word in the 
language. The notion of regular polysemy is exemplified by polysemy patterns such as: 
author-for-works of author, container-for-content, animal-for-meat-of-animal, place-for-
institution, etc. These are all productive and regular patterns, and most of them can be 
                                                          
4 Although she is quite explicit in Carston (2013, 200): “Each word comes with its own distinct but 
schematic meaning, which functions as a constraint on the general pragmatic process of accessing or 
constructing a concept, a process which is wholly motivated by the goal of the pragmatic system which is 
to deliver speaker meaning.” See also Carston (2013; 203): […] an account of word meanings as non-
conceptual (semantically underspecified) would be the completing component of this view of the relation 
between language and thought: not only do sentence meanings underdetermine thought, but the basic 
constituents of sentences (words) underdetermine the basic constituents of thoughts (concepts). If this 
account turns out to be right, it’s not just that we don’t always say what we intend our hearers to take us 





found in many languages of the world (Srinivasan and Rabagliati, 2015). One typical 
way of dealing with these cases is by postulating different representations stored either 
in two separate lexical entries or within a single lexical entry (sense-enumeration 
lexicons) (Foraker and Murphy, 2012); another is to postulate a core common meaning 
(Klepousniotou, et al., 2008, Frisson, 2009, 2015); and yet another is to posit richer 
conceptual representations (Pustejovsky, 1995).  
 
While it is customary that the coordination of two different senses of a polysemous term 
gives rise to zeugma (such as in ‘Arthur and his driving license expired today’), many 
regular polysemies pass anaphoric binding and co-predication tests5: 
 
(1) Give me that book you found so entertaining, and put it on the top shelf; 
(2) Lunch was delicious but took forever;  
(3) London is big but boring; 
(4) That rabbit you see running over there will be delicious. 
Now, what can the kind of thin semantics we are considering say about regular 
polysemy? Can it explain why certain words enter into certain patterns of meaning 
variations? Can it explain why there can be cross-reference between the different senses 
of a polyseme?  
In principle, a thin semantics account such as the one suggested by Carston has to deal 
with polysemy in the same way that it deals with more obvious ad hoc concept 
construction, i.e., with an explanation along the following lines: we access an 
underspecific, schematic, representation. This representation puts some constraints on 
what concept the word can stand for, and provides some instructions about where to 
look within our conceptual structures. Relevance applied to the selected region of 
conceptual space will give us the intended sense of the polyseme, with the result that we 
“home in” on some particular sense (see Frisson, 2009). In sum, in this account, 
particular senses would be ad hoc concepts, and so the rabbit-meat sense in, e.g., ‘he 
                                                          
5 Pustejovsky (1995) distinguishes between “inherent” and “regular” polysemy. Inherent polysemy is a 
subclass of regular polysemy. Its main characteristic is that the senses of the polyseme belong to different 
types. The distinction is not important for our present purposes, though it must be noted that, typically, 




was eating rabbit’ would be the ad hoc concept RABBIT*. We would reach this ad hoc 
concept by inferential pragmatic processes6. Now, if this were all the theory had to say, 
it would be blurring an important distinction and would be unable to explain the co-
predication data. The ‘rabbit’ case would be dealt with like typical ad hoc concepts such 
as ANGEL* in ‘Sally is an angel’ (see fn. 6), while they seem to require different 
explanations and have different behaviors. In fact, the differences between the ‘angel’ 
and the ‘rabbit’ case are so substantial that no theory should treat them as the same 
phenomenon. Besides the data about cross-reference, here are some other relevant 
differences between senses of regular polysemes and ad hoc concepts: (i) the different 
senses of a polyseme prime each other, while it is doubtful that the use of ‘flat’ in ‘the 
sea is flat’ primes FLAT*, with FLAT* being the concept expressed by ‘flat’ in ‘the Tour 
de France third stage is flat’; (ii) there seems to be an essential difference between truly 
ad hoc concepts and senses of a polyseme: the typical ad hoc concepts (ANGEL*, FLAT*) 
are somewhat vaporous, hard to define or pin down or open-ended (Allott & Textor, 
2012), while senses have clear references; (iii) polysemy resolution is usually presented 
as a process of selection, while ad hoc concept formation prima facie implies 
constructing one meaning on the fly: contextual information is relevant in both cases, 
but it seems that in different ways, because in one case contextual information is 
relevant in order to pick out an already existing sense, while in the other it is relevant in 
order to construct a meaning; (iv) finally, and above all: the systematicity of regular 
polysemy requires a specific explanation. 
Now, note that, although the account is not bound to hold that there is no difference 
between the two cases, it is difficult to produce an explanation of the difference between 
                                                          
6 The adoption of a thin meaning semantics in Relevance Theory has some implications with respect to 
ad hoc concepts: according to “standard” Relevance Theory words encode atomic concepts, which give 
access to encyclopedic entries. Hearers reach the thought expressed by the speaker by accessing 
encyclopedic knowledge and gathering from it what is needed in order to adjust explicatures (what is 
said) and implicatures. Thus, to get the thought expressed by ‘she an angel’ as a response to ‘can Sally 
take care of the kids?’, the hearer had to look up in the encyclopedic entry associated to ‘angel’, and 
gather from it the relevant knowledge (that angels are good, that they like kids, or whatever) required to 
construe an ad hoc concept ANGEL* that would help warrant the implicatures (that Sally can indeed take 
care of the kids). This ad hoc concept would thereby form part of the explicature. According to this view, 
the outcome of ad hoc concept construction is typically explained in terms of a change in the extension 
of the encoded concept, either a narrowing or a widening: Wilson & Carston, 2007. However, according 
to the thin semantics proposal, ad hoc concept construction cannot be described in terms of extensions: 
“The approach has consequences for (relevance-theoretic) pragmatics, in that we can no longer think in 
terms of the narrowing or broadening of denotations (or of concept adjustment) as there is no 
linguistically-specified denotation to narrow or broaden (and no concept to adjust). All concepts 
occurring in communicated thoughts (explicatures) are pragmatically inferred and merely constrained by 
an encoded lexical schema/template or an array of activated encyclopaedic information” (2012; 13).  
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regular polysemy and ad hoc concept formation where schematic meanings play a role.  
For instance, it could be said that the peculiarities of regular polysemy depend only on 
how our conceptual space is structured. It may well be a fact of our cognition that 
thinking about an animal such as a rabbit makes us think about its meat; that thinking 
about a container (a bottle) makes us think about its content; that thinking about a 
certain physical object (DVD) makes us think about the information it stores, etc. That 
is, perhaps the activation of one of the senses of a regular polyseme spreads to the 
other(s) in a specially fast and stable way, such that we experience no problem in 
switching from one sense to the other, whereas the process of forming an ad hoc 
concept involves more effortful pragmatic reasoning. Such an explanation could 
perhaps also explain the co-predication data: if two senses are linked by a pattern of 
strong co-activation, then both can be available for predication and anaphoric reference, 
even when the speaker switches from one to the other. As I say, an explanation along 
these lines could well begin to explain the peculiarities of regular polysemy, as well as 
to account for the differences between regular polysemy and ad hoc concept 
construction. However, note that such an account only makes use of cognitive features 
such as co-activation patterns between certain senses. Thin semantic knowledge plays 
no role in the explanation. That is, the theory does not make use of its posits.  
A second problem for the thin semanticist related to regular polysemy stems from the 
idea that semantic representations encode some general, or schematic meaning which 
applies to all the uses of a certain word. Theorists such as Klepousniotou and Frisson 
have applied this idea to the study of polysemy, such that, according to them, there are 
abstract or schematic meanings which can cover all the senses of a polysemous 
expression. Yet, as Foraker and Murphy (2012), claim, it is really difficult to find 
anything in common between the building and the institution sense of ‘school’. That is, 
it is doubtful that some schematic meaning could apply to the different senses of these 
regular polysemes. To say that in polysemy senses are related is not to say that there is a 
number of features, or whatever, that all senses share7.  
                                                          
7 This kind of explanation may account for polysemies generated by metaphorical chains, where it is 
expected that all the different senses of the polyseme are related by virtue of sharing some features. 
Regular polysemies, however, are typically non-metaphorical. One might object that it is possible to come 
up with a representation that encompasses all the senses of, e.g. ‘school’ (building, institution, people 
running the institution, process,etc.), namely, building where kids learn basic things and socialize, forms 
part of an institution, is run by a director named by a body of teachers and parents, etc. However, it is 
obvious that this is not a thin meaning anymore.   
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In sum: regular polysemy presents a problem to the thin meaning theorist. On the one 
hand, thin meanings seem to play no role in the explanation of regular polysemy, which 
is an explanandum of any semantic theory. On the other, it is unlikely that we can find 
or construe an abstract representation which encompasses all the different senses of a 
regular polyseme (see also Falkum and Vicente, 2015; Vicente, 2017). 
Before I move on to discuss other systematic variations, different from regular 
polysemy, I want to introduce the alternative picture which I regard as more reasonable. 
I want to claim that the meaning of a word-type (i.e. its lexical meaning) is that 
conceptual material that the word activates regularly. Moreover, I want to call that ‘a 
concept’, following Vicente and Martínez-Manrique (2016). In psychology, a concept is 
a body of information or a knowledge structure that is used in categorization, inference 
and other higher level cognitive processes (Machery, 2009). According to Vicente and 
Martínez Manrique (2016), a plausible way to decide what belongs and what does not 
belong to a concept is by looking at what kind of information is co-activated in a stable 
and functional way.  So the view is that the lexical meaning of a word is a package of 
conceptual information, tied together by co-activation patterns, that the word activates 
in a stable way. However, the semantic value of a word-token, i.e., what it contributes to 
a particular truth-conditional content, or thought, is not its entire lexical meaning. In the 
case of kind nouns at least, lexical meanings are rich conceptual structures, and what 
goes into contents is thinner than that. What I want to claim is that kind nouns typically 
contribute only  parts or aspects of their lexical meaning to utterance meanings. This 
means that there is a point of agreement with “thin semanticists”, which is that words do 
not contribute their lexical meaning to truth-conditional contents. However, the reason 
why I would defend that the lexical meanings of kind nouns do not get into 
propositional contents is that propositional contents are typically formed of selections of 
noun lexical meanings. Let me try to explain this point. 
One influential approach towards regular polysemy, and in particular towards the so-
called “inherent” (Pustejovsky, 1995) or “logical” (Asher, 2011) polysemy –the one that 
passes co-predication tests- is to construe the lexical meanings of regular polysemes as 
compounds of two or more senses or aspects, which are called ‘dot objects’. Thus, the 
lexical meaning of, e.g., ‘book’ is said to consist in part of the conjunction of two 
aspects: the-book-as-a-physical-object, and the-book-as-a-content, forming the dot 
object “physical object•information”. The word-type ‘book’ activates both aspects of 
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the dot object, but in some cases only one of them will be selected: in ‘the book’ is 
heavy, the aspect that is selected is the “physical object” aspect; in ‘the book is 
interesting’, the selected aspect is “information”; and in ‘the book is heavy but 
interesting’, ‘book’ contributes both aspects and thus the whole “dot object”. 
This way of dealing with regular polysemy is congenial to the “rich meanings” 
approach. It exemplifies a way to explain regular polysemy that appeals to complex 
conceptual structures that offer different denotational possibilities. The dot-object 
approach, however, has some shortcomings: on the one hand, it lacks explanatory 
power, since dot objects are postulated just to account for co-predication patterns. On 
the other hand, it is committed to claiming that the NPs of co-predication sentences 
stand for what seem to be gerrymandered entities: think of a sentence such as ‘Brazil is 
a large Portuguese-speaking republic that has deep problems associated with inequality 
and won five Word Championships’, where ‘Brazil’ would stand for an entity formed 
by a geographical area, a group of people, a political institution, an economic system, 
and a football team. Some formal ontologists (Arapinis, 2013, Arapinis and Vieu, 2015) 
try to defend that we can indeed conceive of that kind of entity as a proper thing in the 
world (in the way that we can conceive of a body and a person as a proper thing in the 
world, i.e. a human being). However, for one thing, the persistence conditions of these 
alleged entities are far from clear8.   
Here I want to just give a broad idea of another way of explaining regular polysemy that 
does not commit to dot objects but also makes use of the idea that senses are parts or 
aspects of whole concepts. If we think about concepts as, roughly, structured 
encyclopedic information, we can think about the aspects that allegedly constitute dot 
objects as specially relevant and accessible features of a concept, not as possible 
                                                          
8 If we say (Chomsky, 2000): London is so unhappy, ugly, and polluted that it should be destroyed and 
rebuilt 100 miles away, it seems that we are claiming that the alleged whole would survive even if only 
one of its parts (its reconstructed buildings and streets) would survive (nowhere is it said that inhabitants 
and councils are moved 100 miles away). However, it seems that the alleged whole should not exist when 
only one of its constitutive parts persist: if we say that a human being is constituted by body and mind, 
then the human being goes out of existence if either part does. On the other hand, if, in the Chomskyan 
situation, all Londoners and the London institutions go on exile and decide not to move to the new 
location, we can also say that London is wherever the Londoners and the institutions are. So, if London 
could persist with the persistence of any of its parts, and parts can persist independently from each other, 




conceptualizations of a complex entity. Let me illustrate this idea by looking into a 
possible representation of the SCHOOL concept (for the polysemy of ‘school’, see 
Frisson, 2009). 
The concept of school can be thought as a structure that encodes the following 
information: 
SCHOOL: 
Kind: Social institution  
-Telos: for learning, socialization, and enculturation of young people. 
 - Temporal realization [associated to the telos of the institution]: a 
process of x years of learning, socialization and enculturation. 
 - Occupants [associated to the telos of the institution]: kids and teachers  
-Physical realization [institutions have to be physically realized]: building.  
-Social realization [institutions have to be organized in some way]: director 
and staff. 
-Representation [institutions are represented in society at large in several 
ways]: football team, basketball team, head of the institution, an elected 
representation of the kids… 
 
This is of course just a rough sketch of what the lexical meaning of school can be like 
and how conceptual knowledge can be represented. Let me explain a bit this sketchy 
representation. The concept of school is labeled, or tagged, as social institution. A good 
part of what we find into the concept/lexical meaning of ‘school’ derives from such a 
labeling or tagging and an inheritance system (Pustejovsky, 1995) or semantic network 
that puts concepts in relation with its superordinates such that subordinate concepts non-
monotonically inherit information from their superordinates. If something is a social 
institution then, unless some information stored in the concept contradicts it, it will have 
a function (a telos), a physical realization, a social realization, and ways of being 
represented. In the Pustejovskyan scheme, the qualia structure also works this way: if a 
concept is an artifact concept, it will have a function (a telic quale); if it is a natural kind 
concept, it will not, etc.  
Given that school is a social institution, its telos specifies its essence. A way of thinking 
about the whole concept/lexical meaning of school is as a theory-like structure whose 
features are explanatorily related to its essence (see Weiskopf , 2011, for an excellent 
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introduction to theory-like concepts). From the particular essence attributed to school 
(that it is for educating young people) follows the idiosyncratic knowledge that 
schooling takes some time, which can be thought of as a process (relevant for 
understanding expressions such as I went to school; meaning: I completed the process 
of schooling: contrast with I went to church), and that schools have kids as occupants, 
as well as the particular physical realization, social realization and the ways in which 
the school can be represented. These features are explained by the essence of school, but 
are not necessitated by it, so they do not provide, all together, a definition of the 
SCHOOL concept.    
I don’t want to hold that the SCHOOL concept is just this theory-like structure. The 
concept has to also contain prototypical information, as well as information about ideals 
(see below). Perhaps this kind of information can be incorporated within the theory-like 
structure that I present (see Hampton, et al. 2009, Bloch-Mullins, 2017, for proposals 
along these lines).  At this point, I only aim at providing a possible explanation about a 
certain kind of polysemy of ‘school’ (the polysemy that affects the word in virtue of 
being about a social institution). The basic idea is that all the nodes in the structure refer 
to salient features of the concept, given our experience with schools in particular, and 
with this kind of social institutions in general. So they are all active when we think 
about schools in any of its different senses: this is the main reason why a speaker would 
use the word school to refer to any of these parts and why the hearer will easily 
understand her. (For empirical results, see Frisson, 2009, Klepousniotou et al. 2008, 
2012).  
A structure like the one sketched above offers denotational possibilities, i.e., a variety of 
possible occurrent denotations from which the speaker has to select. However, these 
“denotational possibilities” are all stored in the lexical entry. That is, the denotation 
potential of a word-type is not explained in terms other than the information stored in 
the meaning of such a word-type. In this view, thus, a word is associated with a number 
of denotations, and a sentence with a number of contents that determine different truth-
conditions. Usually, the number of contents that a sentence can have will appear to be 
smaller than the number of denotational possibilities associated to a single word, given 
that much of the selection of denotations is supposed to be intra-linguistic: in I have 
talked to the school, as talk has selectional restrictions for animacy in both of its 
arguments, there are some denotations of school that are ruled out. However, this point 
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is not obvious. Some authors prefer to talk about selectional preferences instead of 
selectional restrictions (Zarcone, 2014), given that contexts can be concocted where the 
alleged selectional restrictions are violated. 
I don’t have the space to explain co-predication in detail, but it makes sense to think that 
all the senses in the structure above form an activation package, such that senses in the 
package co-activate each other in a way that none of them activate any other piece 
outside the package9. This kind of strong co-activation within a group of senses would 
explain why they are always available both for co-predication and for anaphoric 
binding. Unless the context is very strongly biased for one of the senses, they all remain 
active. It is plausible to think that these packages of strong co-activation are typically 
formed by senses whose denotations are linked by the sort of relations that Arapinis 
(2013) proposes, i.e. spatiotemporal coincidences explained by dependency relations 
(such as realization), or by a representation relation. That is, it is plausible that parts of 
concepts whose denotations have some especially intimate relationship, such as stable 
and explainable co-locations, tend to receive a stronger synchronous activation. This 
would explain why they are always “there”, all active as long as one of them receives 
activation, such that one can easily target each of them for predication and anaphora. 
This general approach can be applied to deal with other now classical problematic cases 
for truth-conditional semantics, such as Chomsky’s ‘London’ case. ‘London’ is a 
polysemous term which, like ‘school’, also has a big number of senses. It can be said 
that the lexical meaning of ‘London’ is a rich concept which stores information about 
London’s being a big area, its being the place where political decisions are taken, its 
hosting inhabitants, its occupying a particular geographical location, etc. Depending on 
which part, or aspect, of this information we focus on, we get one reading or another: if 
we focus on their inhabitants, we can say things like ‘London is friendly’; if we focus 
on the political aspect, we get things like ‘London conspired against Scotland’s 
independence’, etc. However, we can also exploit the fact that all these senses form co-
activation patterns to form co-predication structures. 
The contrast between this kind of explanation and the thin semantics view can be put in 
the following terms: in his defense of an underspecification approach to polysemy, 
                                                          
9 This is in line with empirical results that show that the more distantly related the senses are, the more 
they behave as homonymous meanings, competing for activation (Klepousniotou et al, 2012). 
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Frisson (2009, 2015) lumps together views such as Blutner’s (1998) or Carston’s (2012) 
suggestions, and the Pustejovskyan qualia theory, where common nouns are associated 
with at least four types of information about the objects they refer to: origins, 
constitution, telicity, and the location of the kind in the hierarchy of kinds. The idea is 
that a representation can be underspecific either because it is minimal or because it 
stores too much information. Carston’s underspecific representations are minimal; but 
Pustejovsky’s lexical entries of nouns are underspecific because they basically consist 
in options which can be selected (Frisson, 2009). The lexical entry does not specify a 
content; rather it offers the linguistic processor possible contents. Thus, the lexical 
meaning of ‘school’ does not specify any particular content or value; rather, it offers 
several possibilities: school-as-institution, school-as-building, etc. I think that 
underspecific rich representations can better account for many of those problematic 
cases that have moved many to postulate minimal underspecific representations. 
4. Other systematic alternations 
There are more systematic truth-conditional variations than the variations introduced by 
the regular polysemy we have been looking at. In this section, I want to briefly discuss 
two of them, and will try to suggest that the explanation of systematic truth conditional 
variations in general do not require semantic, constraining, representations. What I 
regard as most original in this section is the hypothesis that at least some of the so-
called “Travis cases” exemplify a systematic kind of truth-conditional variation (due to 
some subtle kind of noun-polysemy). This, I think, is particularly important, because 
one of the main reasons for postulating thin lexical meanings is Travis’ kind of 
“occasionalism” (Travis, 2008). If the best known examples which motivate the 
hypothesis that meanings constrain contributions to propositional contents turn out to 
belong to systematic patterns, accountable for by appealing only to conceptual structure, 
it seems that a good part of the momentum for thin semantics is lost.  
The first systematic kind of truth-conditional alternation I want to mention is that 
between different conceptual structures. It has gone unnoticed until very recently that 
some common nouns alternate in what they contribute to truth-conditions between 
theories and prototypes. Machery and Seppälä (2011) tried with a number of sentences, 
and got the result that competent speakers gave “in a sense yes, in a sense, no” 
responses to the question of whether such sentences were true or false. Some of their 
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examples are ‘Tina Turner is a grandmother’, ‘tomatoes are vegetables’, ‘whales are 
fish’ and ‘chess is a sport’. The idea here is that speakers consider that these sentences 
are true when they think about grandmothers, vegetables, fish and sport in a certain 
way, and they consider that the sentences are false when they think about those things in 
a different way10.  
Machery and Seppälä hold that these common nouns are polysemous, so that what these 
common nouns contribute with to truth-conditional contents alternate between different 
conceptual structures. Their idea is that these different conceptual structures (prototypes 
and theories) are stored separately and can be independently activated. I have argued 
instead that it is more plausible to think that they form part of a unique hybrid 
conceptual representation (hybrid because it hosts different conceptual organizations). 
This hybrid representation is likely the lexical meaning of the common noun, it is stably 
activated by the word-representation, and its different meaning-contributions are 
explained as selections of one conceptual organization instead of another.  
It has been traditional to explain alternations between theories and prototypes as 
coercions. For instance, it has been said that in ‘he is very German’ the individual-level 
predicate GERMAN (in our terms, the theory), is coerced into the prototype of 
Germanhood, a stage-level concept, as a result of a mismatch between the demands of 
the intensifier and the content of the word (Fernald, 1999). However, there is no 
coercion in cases like the ones studied by Machery and Seppälä, which may indicate 
that perhaps in these other cases we also have, instead of coercion, that a particular 
conceptual organization is selected. That is, whereas the bare copula (in most occasions) 
would select the theory, the intensifier, the comparative, the progressive, etc., would 
select the prototype. Be that as it may, it seems that at least some common nouns can 
contribute to truth-conditional contents with different conceptual structures in different 
occasions. However, this fact can be entirely explained by appealing to how the 
conceptual material is organized. We can flip from theories to prototypes and back not 
because both kinds of structures are accessed from semantic representations, but, 
                                                          
10 In a related study, Knobe et al. (2013), use words like scientist or friend to show that there are two 
different rules of application related to two different senses of these words. If asked whether some non-
academic who is very inquisitive and methodical is a scientist, subjects also tend to respond “in a sense, 
yes/ in a sense, no”. It seems that some words fall under regular patterns of sense alternation which could 
be described as definition/prototype (Machery and Seppälä, 2011), and concrete features/abstract ideal 
(Knobe et al., 2013). 
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plausibly, because they are co-activated by word forms directly (or because each 
activates the other).  
Let me now turn to Travis cases. As said above, Travis’ examples have convinced many 
that meaning (i.e. semantic representations) has to be distinguished from content. 
Examples such as the “green leaves” and the “round ball” cases 11, allegedly show that 
the content of a certain expression can vary from occasion to occasion, even though its 
meaning is kept fixed (or so Travis assumes). The view I want to present, in contrast, 
has it that Travis’ famous examples belong to a generalization, and that they can be 
explained by appealing to the different ways we have of conceptualizing objects which 
belong to kinds12. 
First of all, the sentences ‘those leaves are green’, and ‘that ball is round’ exemplify a 
truth-conditional ambiguity similar to the one exemplified by very many other 
sentences: for instance, ‘this car is fast’ (fast in some period including now/intrinsically 
fast), ‘this guy is attractive’ ( attractive in some period including now/intrinsically 
attractive), or ‘that guy is dangerous’ (dangerous in some period including 
now/intrinsically dangerous)13 have the same two different readings that Travis notices 
for ‘these leaves are green’ (green in some period including now /intrinsically green), 
and ‘the ball is round’ (round in some period including now /intrinsically round).  
What these cases have in common is the following. We can think about guys, cars, 
leaves, etc. in terms of how they look or in terms of their essential make-up. Depending 
                                                          
11 In the green leaves case, we are asked to consider two different occasions where the expression type 
‘the leaves are green’ is uttered by someone called ‘Pia’. In the first occasion, Pia is talking to a 
photographer who needs some green leaves for her picture. Pia has decided to paint green some russet 
maple leaves. Still, in that context, her utterance of ‘the leaves are green’ is judged to be true. However, 
then comes along a botanist looking for green leaves. Referring to the very same leaves, Pia says again: 
“the leaves are green”. This time her utterance is judged to be false. Nothing has changed either regarding 
the leaves or in the meaning of the utterance, and yet, what was true then is now false. In the round ball 
case, we are required to consider a ball hitting a wall: the ball is round, in one sense, but it is not round –
rather, it is oval-shaped- if we focus on the shape it is right when it is in contact with the wall. 
12 See Vicente (2012, 2015) for full development. Note that this explanation applies to only some Travis 
cases, the most discussed ones. I do not attempt to explain here other cases, such as those that have to do 
with how color predicates apply to different parts of objects (‘green apple’ vs ‘green watermelon’). These 
other cases fall under different patterns. Del Pinal (ms.) tries to explain them by appealing to a 
Pustejovskian constitutive qualia. McNally and Boleda (forth.) provide an interesting model of more 
detailed mechanisms of composition. 
13 Imagine the following dialogue: “This guy is dangerous”; “No, he’s not. He was made dangerous”; 
“Right, so he’s dangerous. In this world he is”. The second speaker denies that the guy is intrinsically 
dangerous, while the first speaker holds that his character exhibits that property. The distinction is not a 
stage-level/individual-level distinction, as the guy in question may have been dangerous more time during 
his life-span than non-dangerous.  
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on how we think about an object O which belongs to a kind K, whether in terms of how 
it looks or in terms of its essential make-up, sentences of the form ‘Det K is P’ become 
true or false. If talk about aspects is allowed, we can say that there are two different 
aspects that ‘Det K’ can contribute to truth-conditional contents: O-as-it-is, and O-as-it-
looks. Depending on which aspect of O we focus on, we get the two different readings 
put forward by Travis in at least the leaves and the ball case. 
This is related to our having theory-like conceptual structures, and to our mastering the 
is/appears distinction. The theory associated to a certain category consists in an 
explanation of some features that individuals falling within that category have in terms 
of other features that are believed to constitute their essence. However, we know that we 
can change some of the superficial features of individuals without intervening in their 
essence (that is, without making them be some other thing). Developing theories for 
categories and developing this kind of knowledge go hand in hand, and it is described as 
acquiring the essentialist stance (Gelman, 2003). Now, if we have theories on the hand, 
and this kind of knowledge on the other, then, there are two possible ways to have a 
certain feature: intrinsically, as we may put it, or, just currently, or apparently. Put in 
other terms: if a certain determinable property, for instance, a color, is linked to the 
essence of an object of a certain kind (it is part of its essential make-up), the object can 
have the determinate of that property (e.g. be red) which corresponds to its essential 
make up, or it can have another determinate of that property, in which case we would 
have that only the object-as-it-looks has that property (i.e., the object, taken in its 
essential make up, does not have the property, even though the object, seen in terms of 
its current look, does have the property). 
So the following generalization seems to hold: If we have an object (or entity) O of kind 
K, and a property P which is causally linked to the essence of O, then ‘Det K is P’ is 
ambiguous. ‘Det K is P’ may express the thought that O is intrinsically P or that O is 
only currently P. Note that for the ambiguity to be there, the property denoted by ‘P’ 
must be a property causally connected (or believed to be causally connected) with the 
believed essence of O. Otherwise, the ambiguity is impossible: if I cut a long rope short, 
I cannot go on claiming that the rope is long, whereas if I cut a long story short, I can 
keep saying that the story is long.  
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The point, in any case, is that Travis cases such as the much debated “green leaves” case 
–as well as others, such as the “round ball” case-, exemplify this kind of ambiguity. The 
ultimate explanation, hence, lies in the organization of our conceptual knowledge and of 
our cognitive structure more generally; in particular, the explanation involves as 
ingredients our having theory-like conceptual organizations and our being able to think 
about objects alternatively in terms of their appearance and in terms of their essential 
make-up. In sum: the different truth-conditions of ‘the leaves are green’ are not due to 
the interplay between meaning and occasion; they are due to our being able to think 
about objects and their relation to properties in two different ways. As in the case of 
regular polysemy, semantic/conceptual knowledge offers different ways of construing 
propositional contents. The role of the pragmatic system is to select a particular 
construction.  
5. What words can be made to mean 
The view I have presented holds that word-representations of some nouns activate in a 
stable way a certain conceptual structure rich in information. This conceptual structure 
is the lexical meaning of the word. Most, if not all, uses of a noun draw from its lexical 
meaning. However, not all uses of a word can be treated equally. Thus, ‘angel’ in the 
she’s an angel example in section 2, draws its content from the lexical meaning of the 
word-type ‘angel’. However, this case is not like the regular polysemy case: the content 
ANGEL* is, probably rightly characterized as a modulated or strictly ad hoc concept14. 
Cruse (2004) distinguishes between concept-modulation and polysemy, his notion of 
polysemy including the highlighting of aspects (in the way I have suggested we can 
highlight either the as-it-is or the as-it-looks aspects of an object). The difference, I 
believe, lies in that in regular polysemy we just grab from what is there, while in cases 
like the ‘angel’ case we construe a new conceptual representation. We do use elements 
present in the lexical meaning of the word, but the output differs from the input in that it 
behaves as a new category representation. Barsalou (1983) has shown that ad hoc 
categories –which are not exactly the ad hoc concepts Relevance Theory talks about15- 
                                                          
14 It is always difficult to decide when an alleged ad hoc concept is really ad hoc or rather a conventional, 
metaphor-based, alternative meaning/sense of a word. I lack the space to discuss metaphor-based irregular 
polysemies here. Let me just note that it is not important for the overall picture whether or not the 
example of angel is a good example of an ad hoc concept.   
15 Barsalou-concepts are working memory representations of ad hoc categories, i.e., categories which are 
created on the fly, like the categories THINGS TO TAKE TO A CAMPSITE, THINGS THAT CAN KEEP A DOOR OPEN, 
etc. The format of their representation is definitional with prototypicality effects. Carston’s properly ad 
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give rise to typicality effects. An ad hoc concept such as ANGEL* shows typicality 
effects not inherited from the features extracted from the lexical meaning of ‘angel’. It 
is quite plausible that this kind of concepts show many other of the characteristics that 
more entrenched concepts have.  
However, what is interesting is that, again, there seems to be no role for strictly 
semantic representations to play in the story of how we may construe ad hoc concepts 
or modulate the concepts that we have, at least in the case of some common nouns. Ad 
hoc concept-construction, at least in many cases, consists in focusing on some features 
of a stored concept and suppressing and/or adding others  Once this is done, a new 
category representation is generated, which acquires the typical properties that concepts 
have.  
Here I will focus on suppression, which seems to have been relatively more studied than 
addition. However, there seems to be no reason to think that feature-addition would 
involve mechanisms different from those involved in feature-suppression. Feature-
suppression is guided either by compositional or by pragmatic demands imposed by the 
understanding of implicatures (see below). What I mean is that feature-addition is 
reasonably constrained by the same two mechanisms. There is ample evidence that, e.g., 
in metaphor comprehension there is suppression of features (e.g., Rubio-Fernández, 
2007). It is also possible that we suppress features of concepts when figuring out the 
meaning of adjective+noun constructions such as ‘stone lion’ (Hogeweg, 2012). It 
should not be surprising, then, if we find out that in ad hoc concept construction we 
suppress features contained in the lexical meaning of the word that has been used to 
mean what it does not usually mean16. Now, if this is what happens, we can say that the 
process is not constrained by the strictly semantic information that thin meaning 
approaches postulate. That is, we do not need a thin semantic representation to tell us 
how far we can depart from the alleged lexical meaning. In these cases, i.e., cases of ad 
                                                                                                                                                                          
hoc concepts probably have a different texture –they are more vaporous and/or open-ended, and it is not 
easy to specify what categories they pick out (see Allott and Textor, 2012) -. They are not lexicalized, but 
it seems that, in general, they cannot be captured by linguistic means, while there is apparently no 
problem in characterizing linguistically a Barsalou-ad hoc category. Last: in ad hoc concept construction, 
it seems that one creates a concept, whereas in Barsalou’s case what you create is a category. 
 
16 According to the view we have sketched above, lexical meanings could well include several different 
conceptual organizations (prototypes, exemplars, theories, etc.). Some ad hoc concepts could result from 
the suppression of features of a prototype (e.g., JAIL* in ‘my job is a jail’); others from the suppression of 
some of the features of an exemplar (HEXAGON* in ‘France is a hexagon’), etc. 
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hoc concept construction, like the ‘angel’ case, it seems that is enough to have 
pragmatic-implicatural constraints. In the dialogue ‘can Sally take care of the kids?’, 
‘Sally? She’s an angel’, the hearer grasps that the concept expressed is ANGEL* because 
she looks for a response to her question. The actual response has an implicated content: 
yes, Sally can take care of the kids; and provides a justification: Sally is the kind of 
person that loves kids and kids love to be with. So it seems that in order to access the ad 
hoc concept, the hearer has to be able to simply grasp what the response implicates. She 
can do this based on what she knows about angels and on what she takes her 
interlocutor to try to convey. 
In cases where implicatures are not playing this role, selection and suppression of 
features are guided by different mechanisms. As Hogeweg (2012) shows, if we have 
rich meanings, we can explain problematic cases, such as the stone lion case, in a 
straightforward and systematic way. Hogeweg proposes that there are three general 
principles whose interaction determines the interpretation of the noun. These principles 
are: Faith (features of the input must be present in the output), Fit (interpretations 
should not conflict with the –linguistic- context), and Non-Vacuity (all lexical entries in 
the input must at least contribute one feature to the output). The interaction of these 
principles gives as a result the suppression of some features associated with ‘lion’ 
(features that belong to the lexical meaning of ‘lion’) and the preservation of others. The 
status of these principles may be debatable: are they semantic or pragmatic, albeit non-
implicatural? However, what seems clear is that their input is rich conceptual structures, 
which Hogeweg also identifies with lexical meanings, and that the explanation does not 
resort to any other kind of representation.  
Thus, the idea that many new concepts can be accounted for basically in terms of 
feature suppression, is very congenial to the account that lexical meanings are rich in 
conceptual knowledge. In some cases, suppression is guided by clearly pragmatic 
constraints (implicatures); in other cases, the constraints may be some general principles 
of linguistic interpretation. But in both cases, we have that a rich conceptual structure is 
activated as a first step, the second step being the active suppression of a good part of 
what was activated.  
As said above, not all cases of concept-modulation or ad hoc concept construction 
consist in the suppression of features. In many cases, we add features, like when we say 
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‘drink’ to mean ‘alcoholic drink’ (Wilson and Carston, 2007).  However, there is no 
apparent reason to believe that feature-addition requires a kind of representation not 
needed in feature-suppression. As Carston (2012; 13) contends, “all concepts occurring 
in communicated thoughts (explicatures) are pragmatically inferred and merely 
constrained by an encoded lexical schema/template or an array of activated 
encyclopaedic information” (my italics). My claim here is that ad hoc concept 
construction can be fully explained in terms of two constraining mechanism: a rich 
lexical meaning (roughly, her “array of activated enyclopaedic information”) and 
pragmatic and/or compositional demands17,18. Once again, we can do without schematic 
meanings. 
6. Not all meanings are rich? The case of verbs  
Until now I have been arguing for two different theses: first, that postulating semantic 
representations which constrain conceptual content, is at least unnecessary; and second, 
that lexical meanings are rich conceptual structures. However, the scope of these theses 
may well be restricted. In this section, I will suggest that, while prototypical nouns such 
as kind nouns have rich lexical meanings, at least typical verbs may have much thinner 
meanings.  
I have tried to convince the reader that at least kind nouns can contribute to truth-
conditional contents by contributing with parts or aspects of the rich concepts that 
constitute their lexical meaning. Systematic noun polysemy resolution is a matter of 
accessing a significant amount of information and selecting a part of it. Verbs seem to 
be notably polysemous as well. The verb ‘cut’ does not seem to mean the same in ‘cut 
the grass’ and ‘cut the cake’, not to mention ‘cut the interest rates’ or ‘cut at the rope’. 
There is some clear relationship between these different uses of ‘cut’, but it is 
                                                          
17 An anonymous referee asks about the differences between my position and Carston’s, as well as about 
what reasons I have to treat encyclopedic meaning as part of word meaning –and not merely as 
information associated to the word’s meaning. My idea is that word meaning is some kind of structured 
encyclopedic information, a body of knowledge (i.e. a concept), that encodes prototypical and causal 
(theory-like) information, as well as, probably, information about ideals, etc., that is, the knowledge that 
we use in categorization, induction, etc. It counts as word meaning, and not merely as knowledge 
associated to a word, for two reasons: first, because it has an explanatory role to play in explaining 
systematic variations in the contributions of words to truth-conditional contents; and second, because it is 
the only piece of knowledge that plays this role (given that neither literal meanings nor thin schematic 
meanings play any role, as I have tried to show). 
18 As another anonymous referee suggests, this view has commonalities with Kecskes (2008), where he 
argues for a model according to which words store information about past contexts of use which can be 
modulated by current contextual information. That is, words give access to stable information, which is 
plausibly rich, which has an important role to play in linguistic understanding.  
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reasonable to say, on the face of it, that the semantic/conceptual contribution of ‘cut’ is 
not stable. The question that springs to mind is: should we treat verb polysemy in the 
same way we treat systematic noun polysemy, i.e., in terms of rich meanings? I.e. are 
they similar, or even the same, phenomenon? One first reason to be skeptic is that we do 
not seem to store as much information about verb denotations as we do about kinds of 
objects. As Carey (2009) puts it, kind-concepts are “inductively deep” (see also 
Millikan, 2000 on the difference between substances and classes)19. Event-type 
concepts, in contrast, do not allow for so many inductive inferences. If I am told that 
there was a cutting event, there is not much that I can infer (that is, unless I am told 
what was cut)20. So it looks like the information stored in event-type concepts, being 
sparser, will not typically allow for there being parts or aspects to be selected. Another, 
second, reason to think that verb polysemy may be of a distinctive kind is that verb 
senses typically look like specifications: ‘cut the grass’ typically denotes an action 
where the grass is cut in its length, while ‘cut the cake’ typically denotes an action 
where the cake is cut into pieces. The different senses of, e.g., ‘school’, do not look like 
specifications of a more general, abstract, meaning in this same way (it could be held 
that school-the-building specifies the meaning of ‘school’, but it is difficult to say that 
what it specifies is a general, abstract, meaning). That is, whereas the regular polysemy 
that we find in some nouns cannot be accounted for in terms of common cores 
(Klepousniotou et al., 2008), or properly underspecific (vs. overspecific) representations 
(Frisson, 2009), the different senses of verbs do seem to share some features, and so to 
have a common core. I have argued elsewhere (Vicente, 2017) that this is due to the fact 
that the polysemy that verbs typically display is metaphor-based, whereas the regular 
polysemy patterns that nouns such as ‘school’ display is metonymy-based. Lastly, noun-
polysemy is typically bounded, whereas verb polysemy seems relatively unbounded: the 
senses of a verb can extend in innumerable ways.  
                                                          
19 In fact, it seems that common nouns in general behave like attractors of information or nodes of 
inference. Even very small children are prone to generalize and make inferences when the label they hear 
is a common noun, but are much more cautious when the words used are adjectives or form descriptions 
(Fennell & Waxman, 2010). This is related to the essentialist stance: kind terms are assumed to denote 
categories with essences, categories which are the “joints” of nature. We store information about these 
categories because they are the ones which allow for inferences and generalizations. The point, thus, is 
that a kind term will typically give access to much more information, and will relate to a bigger/richer 
concept, than any other term.   
20 Some verb meanings are more informative than others in this respect. If I am told that there was a 
killing event, I can infer a good number of things. However, not many verbs are like ‘kill’, i.e. they do not 
store much information that subjects can use to draw inferences.  
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Let me begin with the relative unboundedness nature of verb senses. If it is conceded 
that the senses in play in ‘cut the grass’ and ‘cut the cake’ are different (though clearly 
related), then it seems that the senses of ‘cut’ can extend without any obvious limitation. 
This, of course, is not to say that ‘cut’ can be made to mean anything whatsoever. The 
point is just that there seems to be no principled list of possible senses of ‘cut’. A 
plausible reason for this behavior of verbs is that the different senses depend partly on 
their internal arguments. Thus, the habitual or default meaning of ‘cut the grass’ is 
different from the habitual meaning of ‘cut the cake’ because the meaning of ‘cut’ 
combined with the meaning of ‘grass’ differs from the meaning of ‘cut’ when combined 
with the meaning of ‘cake’. It is now well-attested that alleged semantic features of 
verbs such as aspectuality (whether they denote states, activities, accomplishments, or 
achievements) and the possibility of certain argument alternations, are rather features of 
at least the whole VPs (for aspectuality, Dowty, 1979; for argument alternations, 
Rappaport Hovav, 2014). As Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2013; 58) put it: “the 
conditions allowing an anticausative use of a verb are not determined purely by its 
lexical properties, but also depend on properties of the event described in a sentence 
with the verb”. 
For instance, depending on the internal argument it takes, ‘cut’ may have different 
grammatical behavior. Thus, ‘cut’ typically enters into the conative alternation (‘John 
cut the rope’/ ‘John cut at the rope’), but not always: ‘the bank cut at its interest rates’ 
does not sound correct (Falkum, 2011)21. Thus, it seems that the different senses of 
verbs are generated or retrieved partly in composition, and in particular, that they partly 
depend on the internal argument verbs take (see Spalek, 2015, for development). A 
possible model which would explain this is the following: the lexical meaning of a verb 
contains sparse information, which can be described as abstract, or general, information. 
In contrast, internal arguments typically give access to rich conceptual knowledge. It is 
this rich conceptual knowledge what ultimately explains the occasional meaning that the 
verb expresses. Thus, one can say that in ‘cut the grass’, ‘cut’ means separating an 
object along the length dimension in at least two halves using an instrument, but only 
because the cutting event is a grass-cutting event. A way to explain how this occurs 
could appeal to a generative lexicon theory (Pustejovsky, 1995), where default phrasal 
                                                          
21 Another example: ‘break’ typically admits the anticausative alternation (‘Jonh broke the window’/’the 
window broke’), but not always: ‘John broke the law’ is ok., but ‘the law broke’ is not (see Spalek, 2015, 
Rapapport Hovav, 2014) 
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meanings arise as a result of interaction between the rich meaning of the nominal, and 
the thin meaning of the verb. An example is the different senses of ‘bake’ in ‘bake a 
potato’ (warm up) and ‘bake a cake’ (create), which is analysed in terms of a process of 
co-composition, involving an interaction between the schematic meaning of ‘bake’ and 
the lexico-conceptual information provided by the nouns (cakes are artefacts that come 
into being by baking them, so to bake a cake is to create it, whereas potatoes are natural 
kinds that come into being by growing, which means that baking a potato does not 
involve creating it, but just preparing it for being eaten).  
As I say, default meanings of verb phrases plausibly depend on a thin meaning provided 
by the verb and rich meanings provided by its arguments (especially, by its internal 
argument). However, the meaning that a verb phrase expresses also depends on 
contextual factors. After all, it is possible to cut a rope lengthways, as well as to bake a 
(frozen) pizza –which is an artefact- by warming it up. Still, it is possible to hold that in 
these cases phrasal meanings also result from the interaction between the verb meaning 
and the meaning of its arguments. One can certainly cut a rope lengthways given that 
ropes are physical objects that have width as well as length. As length is more 
characteristic of ropes than their width, competent speakers will expect that ropes are 
cut transversally. But constructing the meaning of ‘cut the rope’ as “cut transversally” is 
not obligatory, given that it is not obligatory to conceive of ropes as things that only 
have length. 
Suppose then that the lexical meaning of ‘cut’ is some abstract meaning that covers both 
uses of ‘cut’ in ‘cut the grass’ and ‘cut the interest rates’. Spalek (2015), for instance, 
proposes that the lexical meaning of the Spanish verb ‘cortar’ (roughly, but not exactly, 
equivalent to ‘cut’)22 encodes a change of state in which an entity which exemplifies 
some kind of connectedness undergoes a process of controlled disconnection. This kind 
of abstract meaning would be the common core present in the uses of ‘cortar’, both in 
the more “literal” and in the more “figurative” ones (like ‘cortar la circulación’/stop the 
traffic). This common core would then be enriched by interacting with the information 
provided by the verb’s arguments, an interaction that is sensitive to contextual 
information. The thin meaning of the verb could also be said to 
                                                          
22 The translation of ‘cut the interest rates’, for instance is not ‘cortar los tipos de interés’ but ‘recortar los 
tipos de interés’. 
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 provide some kind of constraining conditions on its use; something such as: in normal 
conditions, one cannot call an event a ‘cortar’ event if there is no disconnection 
affecting an entity that was before connected in some way. In previous sections, I have 
argued that we do not need to hold that the lexical meanings of some terms encode 
constraints: both systematic (e.g. regular polysemy) as well as non-systematic variations 
in the meaning expressed by a word can be explained without appealing to a core 
meaning that plays a constraining role. However, it makes sense to think that if a family 
of terms have some kind of schematic meaning, such a schematic meaning will play 
some role in explaining when it is acceptable to use the word. 
The picture about verb meaning we would end up with is similar to that suggested for 
word meaning in general by Recanati (2010) or Carston in several places, in that the 
lexical meaning of a verb is typically impoverished with respect to its occasional 
meaning, which is always a modulation of the lexical meaning. Note, however, that 
modulated verb-token meanings are not exactly Relevance Theory’s ad hoc concepts, at 
least under some interpretations of what these ad hoc concepts are. According to Allott 
and Textor’s (Allott and Textor, 2012) proposal, ad hoc concepts like the one expressed 
by ‘angel’ are somewhat vague and open-ended. Yet, modulations of verb lexical 
meanings do not seem to be like that. Rather, verb meaning modulations typically look 
more like specifications or concretizations. That is, modulations in this case seem to be 
easier to grasp than the meaning from which they derive.  
So, overall, the idea that some words may encode more information than others seems 
to have some intuitive appeal. The systematic patterns of variation in the meaning of 
kind terms (from regular polysemy to Travis-green-leaves-cases) can be accounted for if 
we postulate rich meanings. However, we do not need rich verbal meanings to explain 
how verb phrases mean what they do. Moreover, the polysemy of verbs, being typically 
metaphor-based, suggests that we can account for it by appealing to core meanings, i.e., 
a collection of features that occasional meanings of the verb share. These core meanings 
can be rightly thought of as non-conceptual23, although they are built out from core 
concepts such as CAUSE, CONTACT, GOAL, OBJECT, CONTAINMENT, or SUPPORT (see 
Jackendoff, 1992, Mandler, 2004, and Pinker, 2007 for the question about the 
                                                          
23 As Carston puts it:  “The question is whether there is any definite thought at all or whether any thought 




conceptual character of these primitives). The important issue, in any case, is that these 
meanings would interact with the meanings of the arguments to provide a fully 
conceptual meaning to the verb phrase and, derivatively, to the verb. As mentioned 
above, this view is continuous with the currently prevalent view that semantic features 
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